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Recent developments in macroeconomics, and economic policy in general, have produced a "new consensus"
economy-wide model, where money stock does not play any causal role at all (see Arestis and Sawyer, 2002b;
Meyer, 2001). The stock of money operates a mere residual in the economic process. Others have observed the
absence of the stock of money in many current debates over monetary policy.1 This has prompted a number of
contributions that, wittingly or perhaps unwittingly, have attempted to "reinstate" a more substantial role for money
in this "new" macroeconomics. In this paper we wish to argue that these attempts to "reinstate" money in current
macroeconomic thinking entails two important implications. The first is that they contradict an important theoretical
property of the new "consensus" macroeconomic model, namely that of dichotomy between the monetary and the
real sector. The second is that some of these attempts either fail in terms of their objective, or merely reintroduce
the problem rather than solving it. We include in the first category the class of models that rely on "frictions" in
credit markets (for example, Bernanke and Gertler, 1999), and in the second category the contributions by Meyer
(2001), McCallum (2001) and Laidler (1999). 
We proceed as follows. We rehearse the argument of missing money in section 2 and presenting the "new
consensus" summary macroeconomic model. The four attempts to "reinstate" money are visited in section 3.
Section 4 demonstrates the problems identified above. A final section summarizes and concludes. 
2. THE "NEW CONSENSUS" MACROECONOMIC MODEL 
Although the approach to monetary policy that we have labelled "new" in the introductory section has many facets,
it is possible to summarize some of the key notions in a simple model. However, it should be noted that the
existence of many channels through which monetary policy is seen to operate is masked by this simple approach. 
Following Meyer (2001) and Arestis and Sawyer (2002a, 2002b), see also Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) and
McCallum (2001), some of the key ideas that underpin the "new consensus" may be formally stated as follows:2
(1)        Yg
 t = a0 + a1 (Yg
t-1) + a2 E (Yg
t+1) - a3 [Rt - Et (pt+1)] + s1(2)        pt = b1Yg
t + b2 (pt-1) + b3 Et (pt+1) + s2 
(3)        Rt = re + Et (pt+1) + c1Yg
t-1 + c2 (pt - pT) + c3 Rt-1
where Yg is the output gap, R is nominal rate of interest, p is rate of inflation, pT is inflation rate target, re is the
"equilibrium" real rate of interest, that is the rate of interest consistent with zero output gap which implies, from
equation (2), a constant rate of inflation, and si (with i = 1, 2) represents stochastic shocks. Equation (3) contains
no stochastic shock, implying that monetary policy operates without random errors. It should also be noted that
demand and supply shocks are captured in this model via two avenues: the output gap (through potential output)
and the stochastic shock term in the Phillips curve. There are three equations and three unknowns: output, interest
rate and inflation.
Equation (1) is the aggregate demand equation with the output gap determined by past and expected future output
gap and the real rate of interest. This equation resembles the traditional IS curve, but there are some important
differences. One is that equation (1) is derived from a combination of household optimal saving design, and the
equality between demand and supply. As a result current output depends on expected future output and on real
rate of interest. Expected future output raises current output. This is due to consumption smoothing: expectation of
higher consumption next period associated with higher expected output, suggests higher consumption today and,
thus, higher current output. Similarly, intertemporal substitution of consumption produces the negative coefficient on
the real rate of interest, so that the coefficient a3 corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. This
coefficient may also contain the traditional cost-of-capital effects, to the extent that investment is included in the
model. The lagged output-gap variable captures "nominal rigidities," which emanate from adjustment of prices and
wages to changes in aggregate demand. 
Equation (2) is a Phillips curve with inflation based on current output gap, lagged inflation and on expectations of
future inflation, with the restriction that b2 + b3  = 1.   It evolves from staggered nominal price setting á la  Calvo
(1983), where again the individual firm price-setting decision is the result of an optimization problem. We might
note a key difference between the Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) formulation with other formulations of the
Phillips curve. In the equivalent to our equation (2) formulation, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (op. cit.) utilize expected
future inflation, i.e. Et (pt+1), and not Et-1 (pt) as in some of the other formulations of the Phillips curve. The
implication of this difference is that in contrast to the other formulations of the Phillips curve, there is no inertia or
lagged dependence on inflation in the Clarida, Galí and Gertler (op. cit.) inflation equation; in their formulation
inflation is dependent on current and future economic conditions only. Our approach, just as in Meyer (2001),
incorporates a lagged adjustment hypothesis justified on inertia and lagged dependence on inflation.
Equation (3) is a monetary policy operating rule (of the Taylor's rule form) with the nominal interest rate based on
the "equilibrium" real rate of interest, expected inflation, output gap, deviation of inflation from target, and the
lagged interest rate (this is included as an explanatory variable in this equation to capture interest rate smoothing
intervention by the central bank).3 In a sense this third equation replaces the LM-curve that was previously used in
the discussion of monetary and fiscal policy. The term Et (pt+1) is also of significance, just as it is in equation (2),
for it can signal central bank credibility in the sense that all other things being equal, including the interest rate that
has been set, expected inflation is lower when the central bank is "credible" than when it is not. Taken together,
and to the extent a central bank can credibly signal its intention to achieve and maintain low inflation, this term
indicates that it may be possible to reduce current inflation at a significantly lower cost in terms of output than
otherwise (Kydland and Prescott, 1977).
This model has a number of characteristics, but we only concentrate on those that are relevant to the issue we are
addressing in this paper. Clearly the most important is that the stock of money has no role in the model. It is not
even mentioned in this model, though an equation relating the stock of money to output, interest rate and inflation
could be added which would illustrate the residual nature of the stock of money determined by the demand formoney. Even so the model contains the neutrality of money property, in that equilibrium values of real variables are
independent of the money supply and that inflation is determined by monetary policy (that is the rate of interest).
This is not a surprising result since the money stock is not embedded in the model. But even if the money stock
were introduced in terms of a fourth equation representing the demand for money, it would still be the case that
money is both a residual and neutral. Inflation is viewed as determined by monetary policy (in the form of the rate
of interest) through the route of aggregate demand, namely interest rate changes influence aggregate demand
(equation 1), and aggregate demand influence the rate of inflation (equation 2). 
A further interesting aspect of this model is the mechanism whereby inflation is targeted. This is assumed to take
place through equation (1) where interest rates, themselves determined by the operating policy rule as in equation
(3), affect aggregate demand and via equation (2) changes in the rate of inflation depend on aggregate demand.
Then the strength, timing and predictability of the effects of changes in the rate of interest on aggregate demand
become important questions. Higher (lower) interest rates tend to reduce (increase) aggregate demand, and lower
(higher) aggregate demand is assumed to reduce (increase) the rate of inflation. The possibility that interest rates
are regarded as a cost (by firms) leading to higher prices is not mentioned. This simple model refers to a single
interest rate, and the feed through of the Central Bank interest rate onto long-term interest rates is an issue.
Furthermore, and as one of the former chairmen of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has
recently argued, since the early 1980s this "new" approach to monetary policy "relies upon direct influence on the
short-term interest rate and a much more fluid market situation that allows policy to be transmitted through the
markets by some mysterious or maybe not so mysterious process" (Volcker, 2002, p. 9). 
In the section that follows we concentrate on the first characteristic of the "new consensus" model, that is that the
stock of money has no role in the model. This does not, however, mean the rejection of all the propositions
associated with monetarism (though it appears to involve rejection of any causal role of the stock of money on the
rate of inflation). Two of its most important propositions are clearly embedded in the model. The first is that
monetary policy determines inflation in that inflation converges to the rate set as the objective of monetary policy.
The second is that the level of and the growth rate of potential output are not affected by monetary policy. It is still
the case that control of inflation is viewed as being in the hands of central banks; we can, thus, "clearly see the
influence of monetarism in the consensus model. Monetarism focused attention on the role of central bank in
determining inflation by emphasizing the relation between money and inflation. The consensus model may bypass
money, but it has retained the key conclusion that central banks ultimately determine the inflation rate" (Meyer,
2001, p. 3). 
3. FOUR WAYS TO "REINSTATE" MONEY
LM and Stable Demand for Money 
(Meyer, 2001) proposes that since the new "consensus" model is underpinned by the relation among money,
output and inflation, money can be "reinstated" by adding a fourth relationship, the "old" LM equation, to equations
(1) to (3) and by introducing explicitly a fourth variable, the stock of money:4
(4)         Mt = d0  + d1Rt + d2Yg
t + d3 Et(pt+1) + s3
where M is the stock of money and s3 represents stochastic shocks. 
The author recognizes, however, that adding equation (4) to the system of equations (1) to (3) does not solve the
problem in that the "LM curve ... is not part of the simultaneous structure of the expanded model" (Meyer, op. cit.,
p. 3). What it does is simply to solve for the stock of money consistent with the values of output, prices and the
interest rate as these are simultaneously determined by the solution of equations (1) to (3). In this scenario,
therefore, the role of the LM is merely to identify the stock of money that the central bank would have to provide
given the policy rule and the shocks to the economy. Under these circumstances, Meyer (2001) suggests that the
"money supply has become a less interesting, minor endogenous variable in the story" (p. 4). Concern about the
stock of money, though, has helped to create a consensus that central banks should be responsible for preventingsustained inflation. This, though, has not been extended to embrace the proposition that money has an important
causative role in macroeconomic models or monetary policy. 
In the same paper Meyer (op. cit.) argues, however, that appending an LM as equation (4) to the system of
equations (1) to (3) above, is still valid and produces a meaningful way of "reinstating" money in the new
"consensus" macroeconomic model. It is suggested that "if the money demand equation (underlying the LM curve)
is stable, there will be a stable relationship between money and inflation in the long run" (p. 4). Consequently, so
long as the demand-for-money equation is stable, a long-run relationship between money and prices is implicit in
the new "consensus" model. Under these conditions, "monitoring money growth has value, even for central banks
that follow a disciplined strategy of adjusting their policy rate to ongoing economic developments. The value may
be particularly important at the extremes: during periods of very high inflation, as in the late 1970s and early 1980s
in the United States, and when the policy rate is driven to zero in deflationary episodes, as in the case of Japan
today" (Meyer, 2001, p. 14). However, Meyer (2001) gives no reason to think that monitoring money growth has
value--the amount of money in existence would be determined by demand, and the demand for money depends on
current and past values of prices, income etc.. It would then seem that the stock of money does not have any
"predictive" power, unless it is somehow argued that the demand for money depends on expected future prices and
income, in which case the stock of money could be said to contain some information on those expectations. 
It is clearly the case (indeed a truism) that if the demand for money is stable in terms of output, prices and the rate
of interest, then the growth of stock of money will be closely linked with the growth of prices (inflation); this is
derived by differentiating the demand for money equation with respect to time. However, using the demand for
money equation would suggest that changes in the stock of money are coincident with or lag behind changes in
prices.5 The stock of money may be seen as a forward indicator of nominal expenditure when it is recognized that
loans are taken out to finance nominal expenditure, and that increases in loans lead to increases in bank deposits
and the stock of money. 
A Four Equation Model
McCallum (2001, p. 146) begins by adding equation (4) to the system of equations (1) to (3) but argues that this
would be superfluous since the stock of money would not affect the behaviour of Yg , p and R. It would merely
stipulate the amount of money that is needed to implement the policy rule (3). There would be no need to specify
equation (4) in terms of determining Yg , p and R. However, McCallum (op. cit.) argues, it would be wrong to
view equations (1) to (3) without any monetary aggregate. This is so since "the central bank's control over the
one-period nominal interest rate ultimately stems from its ability to control the quantity of base money in existence"
(McCallum, op. cit., p. 146). In the same contribution, McCallum argues that this could be seen from equation (1)
through (3). Taking the case where Yg = 0, and assuming absence of smoothing, so that c3 = 0, we would have
from equation (1) that [Rt - Et (pt+1)] = a0 / a3, so that from equation (3) we may derive (3)': 
(3)'      a0 / a3 = re + c2 (pt - pT) 
Consequently, if the central bank sets the equilibrium real rate of interest, re, at a0 / a3, then actual inflation would
be equal to the central bank's target value pT. The upshot is that inflation is determined by central bank behaviour.
The Phillips curve parameters are of no consequence, so that inflation is a monetary-policy phenomenon rather
than a non-monetary phenomenon governed by the Phillips curve, or, indeed, a stock (or quantity) of money
phenomenon.6 
In view of these characteristics, McCallum (2001) proposes a four-equation system with the addition of a demand
for money equation and the inclusion of money in equation (1). His precise model differs in a few respects from the
model presented above (for example, he includes a term involving government expenditure minus expected
government expenditure in equation 1, and does not include interest rate smoothing in equation 3, i.e. treats c3 aszero). However, we can represent his amendment in the following way: 
(1)'     Yg
 t  = a0 + a1 (Yg
t-1) + a2 E (Yg
t+1) - a3 [Rt - Et (pt+1)] + a4 [mt - Et (mt+1)] + s1
(2)      pt = b1Yg
t + b2 (pt-1) + b3 Et (pt+1) + s2
(3)      Rt = re + Et (pt+1) + c1Yg
t-1 + c2 (pt - pT) + c3 Rt-1
(4)'      mt = m0 - m1 rt + m2 yt + s3 
where m is the logarithm of M (real value of stock of money), r is the logarithm of R, y is the logarithm of actual
output, and interest rate smoothing is assumed so that now c3 is different from zero. Equation (4)' is the result of an
optimisation procedure, where the elasticity with respect to r is constant and equal to 1 with respect to spending,
proxied here by output. McCallum (op. cit.), then, asks the question of whether the inclusion of [mt - E(mt+1)] in
equation (1)' provides vital information which would otherwise be missing thereby biasing the results. The
theoretical justification is based on the proposition that the size of money holdings have an impact on transaction
costs. An unexpected increase (decrease) in money balances lowers (increases) transaction costs, thereby affecting
expenditure. This would lead to a positive sign for the coefficient a4.7 Calibration analysis is utilized which
demonstrates that "although it is theoretically incorrect to specify a model without money, the magnitude of the
error thereby introduced is extremely small" (McCallum, op. cit., pp. 149-150). A finding that is consistent with
those of Ireland (2001), whose econometric estimates of a parameter similar to a3 are statistically insignificant.
These results support the widely held view that a term like [mt - E(mt+1)] in an aggregate expenditure relationship
performs poorly at the empirical, and theoretical, level (see, for example, King, 2002). 
McCallum's (2001) overall conclusion is that "policy analysis in models without money, based on interest rate
policy rules, is not fundamentally misguided." However, the author is adamant that these policy rules are not
necessarily "preferable to ones based on a controllable monetary aggregate, such as total reserves or the monetary
base" (p. 157). 
Passive-Money and Active-Money Views
The third view comes from Laidler (1999) in an as yet unpublished paper. Laidler (op. cit.) draws a distinction
between a passive-money view and an active-money view of endogenous money. In both views money is
endogenous.8 This much sits very comfortably with the new "consensus." But there is an important difference. It is
only the passive-money view that is consistent with the theoretical framework described by equations (1) to (3). In
the passive-money view, money supply is treated as having no role to play in the determination of output and
inflation. It is merely a residual. This corresponds to the horizontal LM case within the IS/LM framework.9 Under
these circumstances the rate of interest, rather than the money supply, is the policy variable under the control of the
monetary authority. The LM becomes horizontal at the rate of interest set by the monetary authority, and with given
IS aggregate demand is determined. The supply of money passively adjusts to accommodate the
demand-for-money. Inflationary targeting requirements and an expectations-augmented Phillips curve complete the
story; we, thus, have equations (1) to (3). Open economy considerations require the authorities to opt for a flexible
exchange rate regime, although it must be said that the "new consensus" assumes away the complexities of the open
economy model. It is essentially a closed economy model. Clearly, in this framework money has no active, causal,
role. 
The active-money view retains the traditional causative significance of money supply with respect to output and
inflation. Money, it is argued, still has a powerful causal effect on output and inflation. This view begins by
recognizing that the transmission mechanism of the passive-money view as expressed in equations (1) to (3) isincomplete in that it ignores the role of credit. A change in the rate of interest produces a change in the borrowing
needs of the non-bank public. This change affects the money holdings required to finance purchases of goods,
services and assets. Economic agents are, thus, off their demand-for-money-in the passive-money view economic
agents move along their demand-for-money, they are never off it.10 This is the buffer stock  idea of money
demand, the idea that money holdings constitute a target of an inventory. The level of buffer stock is subjected to
fluctuations around the target, as income and expenditure are influenced by shocks of all types.11 A relevant shock
is a change in the aggregate money supply, not initially matched by a change in the target money holdings. To the
extent that this is a permanent  change, economic agents would hold stocks of real money balances whose implicit
service yield is different from that on other assets. A significant change in the size of the buffer stock will, thus,
ensue. This requires a change in one or more of the variables in the demand for money (rates of return, including
own rate, opportunity cost of holding money, output and the price level) change to bring the quantity of money
demanded into equilibrium with the new money supply. Consequently, "the quantity of money is an endogenous
variable in the economic system, but it clearly plays an active role in the transmission mechanism" (Laidler, 1999, p.
10). The ultimate outcome of this process is very difficult to gauge. Indeed, Laidler (op. cit.) suggests "there seems
virtually no limit to the possibilities, a sure sign of some deficiency in our theoretical understanding of the matters
under discussion" (p. 11). 
The usual analysis runs in terms of the effects of an increase in the requirement for loans to finance new investment,
but once the investment has occurred, savings and profits are generated and some or all of the loans are paid off.
Laidler considers a different case where there is a permanent increase in the demand for loans--it could be said for
loans to fund investment rather than for loans to finance investment. As Laidler indicates, an increase in loans
requires a corresponding increase in bank deposits. A new equilibrium would be reached when banks are willing to
meet the increased demand for loans, when the public is willing to hold the increased bank deposits and the banks
are willing to allow the public to hold increased deposits. To trace through the effects of the increased demand for
loans is complex in that it requires some assumption as to why there is an increased demand for loans (what are
people going to do with those loans which have a cost?) and how relative interest rates (on loans, bank deposits
and other financial assets) adjust to bring equality between demand and supply of loans and demand and supply of
bank deposits. When there is a disequilibrium and there is not an equality between the amount of bank deposits in
existence and the public's willingness to hold bank deposits, then it could be said that bank deposits (money) are
playing an active role in that steps are being taken to adjust holding of money to that which is desired. However the
underlying cause in this story is the change in the demand for loans: without that change, the stock of money would
not change. 
The empirical evidence on these views of money is also deficient. Vector Error-Correction Modelling (VECM)
using Canadian data has been utilized to disentangle the theoretical intricacies discussed in this sub-section
(Hendry, 1995). Two relevant conclusions are pertinent: money plays an active role in the transmission mechanism
but there is also a "non-trivial passive element to money's role in that mechanism" (Laidler, 1999, p. 14). 
Credit Market "Frictions" 
This approach has been developed in connection with the relationship between asset prices and the real economy
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1999). The relationship is made operational through the "balance sheet channel." It relies
on two major assumptions. The first is that the ratios of capital to assets and debt to assets are important. The
second is that credit markets are characterized by "frictions," such as "problems of information, incentives, and
enforcement in credit relationships" (Bernanke and Gertler, op. cit., p. 87). An important implication of these
credit-market imperfections is that borrowers with strong financial backing can obtain credit more readily and at
lower cost than otherwise. Credit-market "frictions" imply that cash flows and balance-sheet positions are key
determinants of agents' ability to borrow and lend. 
The existence of credit market "frictions" implies that firms and households use some of their assets as collateral in
the borrowing activities in order to ameliorate the "frictions" referred to above. Consequently, these "frictions"
create an environment where external finance is more expensive than internal finance when the former is not
covered by collateral. This defines what is labelled as the "external finance premium," namely the differencebetween the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds internal to the firm. This premium
affects the overall cost of capital, thereby affecting investment decisions and aggregate demand; and as Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) put it, "In short, when credit markets are characterized by asymmetric information and
agency problems, the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem no longer applies" (p. 4). Under such circumstances a
change in asset values can potentially have substantial effects. For example, a decline in asset values, reduces
available collateral which impedes potential borrowers' access to credit. At the same time, lenders' ratio of capital
to assets is reduced, thereby decreasing potential lending and/or discriminating against certain bank-dependent
sectors such as small business. The inevitable impact of deteriorating balance sheets and reduced credit flows is
primarily on spending and, thus, on aggregate demand in the short run. In the long run aggregate supply may very
well be affected since capital formation is adversely influenced along with working capital. These are also
accompanied by significant multiplier effects, referred to as the "financial accelerator" that affects output dynamics
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; see, also, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996, and Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1998). "Financial accelerator" also includes feedback effects on asset prices, emanating from declining
spending and income along with forced asset sales, thereby producing "debt deflation."
Generally speaking, the "financial accelerator" mechanism relies on endogenous developments in credit markets
that work to propagate and amplify shocks to the macroeconomy. The mechanism in this context relies heavily on
the link between the "external finance premium" and the net worth of potential borrowers.12 In the presence of
credit-market "frictions," the "external finance premium" is inversely related to the net worth of borrowers. The
lower the net worth of borrowers, and, thus, the weaker their ability to provide collateral, the higher the required
agency costs, so that lenders must be compensated for higher agency costs, implying higher "external finance
premium." The whole process, however, is highly non-linear, in that "if balance sheets are initially strong, with low
leverage and strong cash flows, then even rather large declines in asset prices are unlikely to push households and
firms into the region of financial distress, in which normal access to credit is jeopardized, or to lead to severe
capital problems for banks. Put another way, the extent to which an asset-price contraction weakens private sector
balance sheets depends on the degree and sectoral distribution of initial risk exposure" (Bernanke and Gertler,
1999, p. 84). 
The quantitative aspects of this approach are revealing. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) undertake
calibration exercises of the model that includes credit-market "frictions" and the "financial accelerator" effect of an
unanticipated 25-basis point decline in the nominal interest rate, strongly supports the model's key contentions.
More concretely, the output response is about 50 per cent greater, and the investment response nearly twice as
great, both in the model with the credit-market factors than in the baseline model that excludes them. The
persistence of these effects is also substantially greater, with "output and investment in the model with credit-market
imperfections after four quarters are about where they are in baseline model after only two quarters" (Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist, op. cit. p. 35). A further important result of the same study is "the tendency for policy effects
to linger even after interest rates have returned to normal" (p. 36). 
The relevant question in this context is the extent to which this model is amenable to embedding the stock of money
within it. To begin with, the credit market "frictions" model does not explicitly discuss the stock of money. The
model includes bank deposits only and households hold these, which are matched by loans held by businesses. At
the aggregate level, bank deposits equal bank loans so that the net worth of the private sector is unchanged by
changes in bank deposits. Now as we have seen earlier the role of net worth relative to capital stock is particularly
stressed in this model. It is the case then that households hold the base money, which is created by the central
bank, and consequently that does not affect the net worth of firms. In Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998),
households hold "base" money (issued by the government), but the government funds its budget deficit such that
sufficient "base" money is supplied to satisfy the demand for money (which is related to consumer expenditure and
the nominal rate of interest). Hence the stock of "base" money can be viewed as endogenously determined by the
demand for money. The stock of money can still be seen as relevant in this context when money is seen as one of
many assets, and as such it is part of the "collateral" and that both households and firms need to hold the asset
labelled as money, although the implication is that the stock of anything that can serve as "collateral" could be
relevant. It ought to be noted, however, that if money here is base money, then the model would need changing to
explain why banks would hold base money (a barren asset) other than for transactions demand purposes. If moneyis bank deposits, for collateral purposes it would need to be netted out against loans, and since it is assumed that
households hold deposits and not loans (or at least households hold more deposits than loans), then firms have
negative net worth vis-à-vis the banks, and an increase in the stock of money would reduce their wealth, which
would tend to deflate demand. There is, further, the question of why firms would use money as a collateral, rather
than use the money to finance whatever expenditure they wished to undertake. It would have to be assumed that
banks were willing to lend firms a multiple of their holdings of money. But for the banks that would be close to
unsecured lending. 
4. MODEL ASSESSMENT 
This section attempts to assess the four models discussed in section 3. The aim is to ascertain whether the
treatment of money undertaken succeeds in "reinstating" it in the sense of having a causal role in the respective
models. We also attempt to examine the implications for the main theoretical aspects of the "new consensus" as
discussed in section 2. 
We may begin with the Meyer (2001), "LM and Stable Demand for Money," contribution. The thrust of the
argument in this approach falls squarely on the stability of the demand for money. But even if the demand for
money is stable, it would still be the case in this approach that the stock of money is demand determined, and the
demand for money depends on current and past values of prices, income etc. However, the whole point of the
"new consensus" on monetary policy is that the demand-for-money relationship has been shown to be sufficiently
unstable that renders monetary policy in the form of monetary targeting uncertain. It is also the case that the degree
of this uncertainty is made even worse by the fact that the channels through which monetary targeting works its
potential impact through the economy is by far more indirect than that of the monetary policy operating rule of
equation (3) above. It is, thus, the case that Meyer (2001) does not offer a satisfactory solution to the problem in
hand; it merely re-states it. Furthermore, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) demonstrate that "Large unobservable
shocks to money demand produce high volatility of interest rates when a monetary aggregate is used as the policy
instrument. It is largely for this reason that an interest rate instrument may be preferable" (p. 1687). This is
particularly the case when narrow monetary aggregates are used. But broad monetary aggregates are as hopeless
as intermediate targets. Their relationship with aggregate economic activity variables is highly unstable to be of any
usefulness. It is for this very reason that most, if not all, of major central banks models do not even include a
monetary aggregate of any shape or form.13 Not only are the shocks just referred to the cause of high interest rate
volatility, but they occur quite frequently to be of any comfort. The global monetary history of the last 30 to 40
years clearly testifies to this statement. It, thus, becomes difficult to sustain the argument that the
demand-for-money can be reasonably stable for a sufficient period of time to make it possible, and sensible, to rely
on monetary aggregates. We are back to the original question still of how to "reinstate" money in a macroeconomic
model. 
McCallum's (2001) contribution is more relevant in that an attempt is made to introduce money directly into
equation (1), which then requires a fourth equation to explain it. The key assumption in McCallum's framework is
that of a tight relationship between the stock of money and the size of transaction costs. For example, a higher
volume of the stock of money lowers transaction costs and enhances consumption expenditure. The trouble with
these propositions of this approach, however, is that they "do not appear to be empirically significant nor do they
correspond to the main channels of policy as seen by earlier generations of economists" (King, 2002, p. 171). 
It should be noted that McCallum (2001) treats the stock of money as created by the Central Bank, and that the
Central Bank may set either the interest rate or determine the stock of money. His utility maximization framework is
set up in terms of an exogenously determined stock of money. The link between the rate of interest and the stock
of money is said to come (p. 148, equation 18) from the Fisher identity between nominal interest rate, real rate and
the (expected) rate of inflation. This enables McCallum (op. cit.) to say that the roles of nominal interest rate and
stock of money can be reversed, and the stock of money treated as endogenous and the (nominal) rate of interest
as exogenous. But the stock of money is here only endogenous in the sense that its rate of growth, assumed to be
equal to the expected rate of inflation, is linked with (equal to) the difference between the nominal rate of interest
and the (equilibrium) real rate of interest. There is no discussion of which definition of money is appropriate here:monetary base (relevant to the Central bank), narrow money (such as M1 relevant for transactions purposes) or
broad money; but the implication of endogeneity is clear. 
In Laidler's (1999) contribution it is stated that the monetarist case "calls for the authorities to set a course for a
supply of money determined independently of the demand for it, it treats money as an active variable in the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy" (p.3). When money is bank money created through the granting of
loans, then there is a stage at which the supply of money (stock of money) is independent of the demand for it.
There is then some adjustment process through which the supply (stock) and the demand are reconciled. If by
assumption (that the demand for loans has permanently increased) the stock of money (bank deposits) increases
and cannot be diminished, then adjustments will follow which could be said to involve the stock of money.
However, it has to be remembered that the stock of money would not remain higher unless the demand for loans
remains higher. Money is created through the loan creation process, and that money will be spent (that being the
purpose of securing the loan) and will be accepted (money being a generally accepted medium of exchange). In
general, those receiving the money will not wish to retain it (money being a barren asset) but will wish to dispose of
it in some way--whether through spending, repayment of loans or purchase of financial assets. Only in that limited
sense, can money play an active role. 
Turning to the fourth approach considered above, King (2002) seeks to use the idea that money can alleviate
frictions in the financial markets to restore the role of money. That money can alleviate "frictions" in financial
markets, emanates crucially from its ability to provide liquidity to the financial system in general and financial
markets in particular. King argues that "Money enables individuals, both households and firms, to avoid borrowing
should they hit a cash-flow constraint. Since the probability of experiencing such a constraint falls as the stock of
money rises, changes in money could affect relative asset returns" (p. 172). Money is one of many assets, and
changes in its quantity can have an important effect via its impact on borrowers' balance sheets. However, one
person's bank deposit is another person's loan, and the possession of loan raises the probability of having to
borrow. A further qualification to King's (2002) argument is that it does not state how the change in the money
stock occurs. It seems to resort to an exogenous money argument, for in an endogenous context, some change in
"tastes" will lead to changes in prices (rates of return) and in quantities. 
However, when "credit market frictions" are considered, it would seem that monetary policy can have effects on
real activity in both the short run and the long run. Quite simply, credit rationing impacts on the firms' (and others)
ability to carry through expenditure decisions, including those on investment. Thereby investment expenditure is
influenced by monetary policy, and hence the future level and structure of productive capacity. 
Evidence has been produced that shows that the monetary policy rule may have significant effects on real activity
(Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, 1997). We have indicated elsewhere (Arestis and Sawyer, 2002b), based on
results of macroeconometric model simulations undertaken by others, that monetary policy in the form of interest
rate changes has a stronger impact on investment than on other types of expenditure. This we indicate by examining
the channels of monetary policy and their quantitative importance in three well-known and widely-used
macroeconomic models of the Bank of England, of the Federal Reserve System and of the European Central
Bank. There is, however, dispute as to the precise amount and the extent of its impact, i.e. short-term effects only
(Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999), or long-run effects as well (Arestis and Sawyer, 2002b). 
The last conclusion is actually supported by the "new consensus" approach. For example, Bernanke and Gertler
(1999) are very clear when they argue that "Deteriorating balance sheets and reduced credit flows operate
primarily on spending and aggregate demand in the short run, although in the longer run they may also affect
aggregate supply by inhibiting capital formation and reducing working capital. They are also likely to be significant
feedback and magnification effects" (pp. 82-83). These conclusions are significant for the purposes of this paper.
Recall that the two propositions, that monetary policy determines inflation only, and that the level of and growth
rate of potential output are not affected by monetary policy, are at the heart of the "new consensus." The analysis
we have just conducted clearly suggests that monetary policy influences not just inflation but also long-run output
through effects on investment. Indeed, the level of and growth of potential output can be affected by the analysis
afforded by the credit market "frictions" as elaborated above. The theoretical dimension of the "new consensus,"therefore, may have to be recouched and reformulated to account for these theoretical implications.14 Clearly,
though, the credit market "frictions" argument would also have to be revised to account for the changes suggested
above if money is to be firmly restated within the confines of this model. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have attempted to summarize the argument of missing money and the "new consensus" macroeconomic model.
This enabled us to examine a number of attempts to reinstate money essentially in this macroeconomic model.
These attempts have been found to either fail in their objective or be accompanied by serious theoretical
implications. We have argued that the latter approach is promising, especially in terms of its implications, namely
that the impact of monetary policy can have both real and nominal effects. 
We may conclude this contribution with a brief comment on the nature and role of money in the economy. When
money is viewed as exogenous money, the supply of money is a macroeconomic phenomenon in that there is one
agency (usually government or Central Bank) that determines the level of the stock of money for the whole
economy. The supply of money cannot be disaggregated into the supply of money by individual economic agents.
Individuals have a demand for money, and the developments in the economy depend on how the sum of the
individuals' demand for money compares with the given supply of money. In the endogenous money approach,
there is a "supply of money" by individual banks (which is more accurately a willingness to allow deposits to be
held) that can be summed to give an overall supply of money. Further, the stock of money changes as a
consequence of other changes that are taking place; the clearest example being that when the stock of loans
changes, there will be changes in the stock of bank deposits. The recent developments on monetary policy, some
of which have been summarized in this paper, deal with money as if it were endogenous, but without labelling it as
such and, more seriously, without providing relevant theoretical arguments of the endogeneity of money. 
We would suggest that a fruitful way forward is to develop theoretical arguments on the premise of endogenous
money, and to study the process of credit creation (and thereby the creation of bank deposits) rather than just
model the stock of money as a residual. This would also have to analyse the credit system, and how the demand
for loans is (or is not) satisfied by the banks. Such an approach would be more fruitful and would, indeed, provide
a more promising attempt to deal with monetary phenomena. 
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NOTES 
1. Laidler (1999) states that "the Quarterly Projection Model which nowadays provides the analytic
background against which Bank [of Canada] policies are designed, includes no variable to represent this
crucial aggregate [stock of money]" (p. 1). King (2002) makes the case even in stronger language; he
argues that, "as price stability has become recognized as the central objective of central banks, the attention
actually paid to money stock by central banks has declined." Surprisingly perhaps, "as central banks became
more and more focused on achieving price stability, less and less attention was paid to movements in money.
Indeed, the decline of interest in money appeared to go hand in hand with success in maintaining low and
stable inflation" (p. 162).  
2. The models used in the contributions mentioned in the text, are similar in that they capture the essentials of
the "new consensus." There is, however, one difference worth commenting on. The Meyer (2001)
contribution, and Arestis and Sawyer (2002a, 2002b) that are based on it, is the more general in that it
accounts for both "backward looking" and "forward looking" elements. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) and
McCallum (2001), employ only the "forward looking" assumption.  
3. The interest rate-operating rule is actually a rule for the real interest rate. Nominal interest rate is used as ashort-term instrument, but in the long run it is re that matters. This can only be undertaken, of course, when
prices are not completely flexible, an important assumption of the "new consensus."  
4. We prefer to use the term stock of money, rather than money supply, here in that the term supply of money
implies that the amount of money is determined by the suppliers of money. In this context, the argument is
that equation (4) is based on a demand for money approach, with the added assumption that the stock of
money is determined by the demand for money.  
5. However, if expected change in prices were relevant for the demand for money, then a scenario could be
envisaged in which actual changes in price lagged changes in demand for money.  
6. The model reflects current practice in macroeconomic policy. Monetary policy is seen to influence inflation
via aggregate demand. An alternative policy regime could be one where fiscal policy was used to influence
aggregate demand, and thereby the rate of inflation. Equation (3), reflecting monetary policy, would be
replaced by an equation in which fiscal policy is adjusted depending on deviation of inflation from target and
output from trend level. In such a case, inflation would be a fiscal policy phenomenon.  
7. There are other theoretical arguments for the inclusion [mt - E(mt+1)] in equation (1)', in addition to
transaction costs emphasized in McCallum (2001). These arguments are summarized in Leahy (2001, pp.
161-162), and include: non-separable utility, utility constraints, cash-in-advance constraints, segmentation of
the goods and assets markets, and the lending view.  
8. There is a sharp distinction between endogeneity and exogeneity on the one hand and passive and active
views on money on the other hand. The passive and active views on money are actually based on the
proposition that money is endogenous in any case. Laidler (1999, section 3) is very explicit on the
importance and precise distinction of these notions.  
9. Note though that the LM is horizontal here not because of the operation of any liquidity trap (which is
associated with the demand for money) but rather through the Central Bank maintaining a given rate of
interest, and providing whatever reserves are demanded at that rate of interest.  
10. A qualification may be added to the buffer stock argument. Individuals should be seen as "forced" off their
demand for money schedule only if the amount of money they hold goes outside the range that they had set
for the buffer stock. Hence a relatively small increase in the stock of money would not "force" individuals off
their demand curve.  
11. These shocks range from economy-wide and localized shocks, foreseen and unforeseen, as well as
transitory and permanent. The analysis in the text assumes permanent shocks; transitory shocks are unlikely
to have any significant effects in that by their very nature, it is expected that they are quickly reversed.
Brunner and Meltzer (1993) argue for the relative importance of the transitory versus permanent shocks
distinction, in relation to that between economy-wide and localized shocks.  
12. The net worth of potential borrowers is defined as "the borrowers liquid assets, plus collateral value of
illiquid assets less outstanding obligations" (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1998, p. 4).  
13. This is certainly the case for the models of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Federal
Reserve System.  
14. The argument could be put forward that Laidler's (1999) notion of active money would fit in with the
approach of Bernanke and Gertler (1999) in the following sense. What Laidler (op. cit.) would identify as
active money, Bernanke and Gertler (op. cit.) would think of as liquidity that removes credit constraints. It
also seems to be the case that in both approaches it is entirely ignored that there are two sides to the
balance sheet. So that when the stock of money is high the stock of loans outstanding is also high, in that at
least collectively people have taken out loans that would enable them to spend. It might also mean that when
the stock of money is high, there are credit limits (as the stock of loans is high). Consequently, the
mechanism may work in the opposite way to which they indicate. 